This paper studies the market interactions between MicroGrids (MGs) and Aggregators (AGs) from a noncooperative perspective. Specifically, we study a Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problem (GNEP), where players are the MGs and AGs, and aim at maximizing their respective benefits. MGs' actions are the generated energy as well as the traded energy with other MGs, whereas AGs actions are the load scheduling of their subscribed users. The variational solutions of the GNEP are characterized and a distributed algorithm for its computation is proposed. By numerical simulations, it is shown that the variational solutions of the GNEP perform close to the solution of the network utility maximization problem.
INTRODUCTION
In today's power grid, energy is generated by a few generation plants and transported over long distances to the end clients. The smart grid aims at modernizing the traditional power grid by capitalizing on some of the recent groundbreaking advances in information and communication technologies. The smart grid architecture is being designed to dynamically accommodate new energy generators and loads. As a result, future's power grid will be composed of smaller grids, known as MicroGrids (MGs), in which energy is locally generated and consumed, and that can operate in islanded mode, i.e., without connection to the main grid. A large and distributed deployment of MGs will improve reliability in power delivery as well as efficiency and sustainability of energy usage [1] . Additionally, energy trading among MGs and with the main grid is a potential solution to reduce the operational costs as well as to compensate for possible energy unbalances within the MG.
Demand Response (DR) programs are another alternative for reducing costs at the MG and consist in modifying users' energy demand, e.g., through direct load control or through dynamic pricing schemes. DR has been thoroughly investigated since the 60s and it is already being used for large energy consumers, mostly in the industrial sector. However, low energy consumers have been traditionally ignored in DR programs due to their reduced impact on the market. DR Aggregators (AGs) have recently appeared as new market agents, capable of controlling and managing compounds of small energy consumers, granting omnipresent access to DR programs [2] .
An energy trading strategy among MGs operating in islanded mode was derived in [1] . DR programs for deferrable loads were investigated in [3] and [4] . In [5] , the authors studied an energy consumption scheduling game among energy consumers. Similarly, the work in [6] across users to optimize energy generation and storage. The work in [7] characterized the Nash equilibrium of the game obtained when selfish consumers compete to minimize their individual energy cost. The specific role of AGs in DR programs has been considered in [2, 8] . The work in [2] considered a system with AGs and utilities and investigated the generation in each utility and the load scheduling at each AG that minimize the total cost.
In contrast to previous works, this paper considers that MGs simultaneously design their generation and trading strategies and contract DR AGs to equalize their demand. We study a non cooperative Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problem (GNEP), where both MGs and AGs aim at maximizing their own revenue. We show that the variational solutions of the GNEP perform close to the solution of the Network Utility Maximization (NUM) problem.
SYSTEM MODEL
We study the ahead planning over T time slots of a power grid composed of M MGs operating in islanded mode. MGs generate energy by different means (e.g., oil or coal generators) and can trade energy according to their energy demand and generation costs. The energy generation cost of MG m, m = 1, . . . , M, at time slot t, t ∈ T {1, . . . , T }, is denoted by cmt(gmt), where gmt stands for the total generated energy in MWh. The cost function cmt(·) is assumed to be twice continuously differentiable and convex. Let vector gm (gmt)t∈T stack the energy generated at MG m over the whole time horizon. Similarly, let vector function cm(gm) (cmt(gmt)) t∈T stack the generation costs. The energy generated in a certain MG is constrained by the maximum capacity of its generators denoted by the positive constantĜm. Accordingly, the energy generated by the m-th MG must satisfy gm ∈ Gm with Gm {gm ∈ R T : gmt ∈ [0,Ĝm], ∀t}. Let set M contain the existing MG connections, i.e., MG m is connected to MG m = m if pair (m, m ) [or pair (m , m), indistinctly] is contained in M. Similarly, set Mm contains the indices of MGs connected to MG m, i.e., Mm {m : (m, m ) ∈ M}. When two MGs are connected, they can trade energy. Let e mm t denote the energy bought, e mm t > 0, or sold, e mm t < 0, by MG m from/to MG m at time slot t. MG pairs (m, m ) ∈ M must reach consensus on the traded energy, i.e.,
When energy is traded between MGs m and m , some inherent energy transfer costs are assumed to be paid to the distribution system operator. We introduce the monotonically increasing, twice continuously differentiable, convex function γ mm t (e mm t ) to account for the transfer cost at MG m when e mm t MWh are traded with MG m . Let vector em (emt)t∈T , with emt (e mm t ) m ∈Mm , stack the traded energy over the whole time horizon at MG m. Similarly, vector function γ m (em) ((γ mm t (e m mt )) m ∈Mm ) t∈T stacks the energy trading costs. Finally, the energy traded in a cer- tain MG is limited, among other factors, by the maximum capacity of the distribution lines. Thus, the traded energy must satisfy em ∈ Em {em ∈ R T |Mm| : e mm t ∈ [Ȇ mm ,Ê mm ], ∀t}, whereȆ mm ≤ 0 andÊ mm ≥ 0 limit the maximum energy sold and bought by MG m to/from MG m , respectively. Note that, by settingȆ mm = 0 (Ê mm = 0), one can prevent MG m from selling (buying) energy to (from) MG m .
Let u denote the user index and Um denote the set of users served by MG m. User u ∈ Um requestsx ut MWh from MG m to activate the -th appliance at time t, = 1, . . . , L, with L being the total number of appliances. Contrarily to [9] , which applied dynamic pricing techniques to incentivate users for shifting their demands, we consider that the m-th MG charges a flat tariff, qm, in $/MWh, for the consumed energy. To avoid peak energy demands at the MG operator, direct load control is considered, which allows shifting certain user loads. To palliate users' discomfort arising from load relocation, the u-th user receives an energy discount, d ut (x ut ), in $, when the -th appliance receives x ut instead of the originally requested load, x ut . As in [8] , we assume d ut (x ut ) to be a twice continuously differentiable convex function that takes value 0 when no deviation from the reference load is produced, i.e., d ut (x ut ) = 0. The convexity assumption follows from the fact that users request larger discounts as the difference with the reference load increases. Definē
, as the vector that stacks the original load request of user u. Similarly, let vector xu = (xut)t∈T , with xut = (x ut ) L =1 , denote the actual load received by user u, and let vector function du(xu)
Define Xu as the convex set of possible load vectors of user u. In particular, we enforce that all requested loads must be scheduled within the time horizon T , i.e., Xu {xu ∈ R LT + : t∈T x ut = t∈Tx ut , ∀ }. Further constraints can be included in Xu, e.g., to limit maximum or minimum instantaneous loads of appliances.
We consider two case studies. First, in Section 3, we study the noncooperative revenue maximization problem at the different MGs without DR. Second, in Section 4, we address the scenario in Fig. 1 , where MGs set up an agreement with AGs to outsource DR services.
ENERGY TRADING WITHOUT DEMAND RESPONSE
Without DR, the objective of each MG is to design its energy generation and trading strategy, ym = [gm, em], to maximize its own benefit, i.e., the difference between incomes and costs:
In practice, the strategy of MG m, ym, has to satisfy the requirements stated in Section 2, and also ensure supply and demand balance, i.e., gmt = u∈Um 1 T Lxut − 1 T |Mm| emt, ∀t. In particular, the constraint in (1) couples the feasible set of MG m with the strategy of the other MGs, e−m (e m ) m ∈Mm . Hence, the feasible set of MG m is Ym(e−m) {gm ∈ Gm, em ∈ Em : gmt =
∀t, e mm t + e m mt = 0, ∀m ∈ Mm, ∀t}. Since the MG income, qm u∈Um 1 T LTxu , is constant [see (2) ], the m-th MG revenue maximization problem can be equivalently rewritten as follows:
where fm(ym) 1
From above, it is straightforward to see that the ahead planning of the power grid is a GNEP with shared constraints [10, Def. 4.5], where each player (i.e., each MG) aims at solving (3). A generalized Nash equilibrium is a feasible point (y m ) M m=1 such that fm(y m ) ≤ fm(ym), ∀ym ∈ Ym(e −m ) for each MG m = 1, . . . , M. Due to the coupling on the players' feasible sets, it is difficult to derive all the geralized Nash equilibrium points [10] . In this regard, we restrict our attention to the variational solutions of the GNEP, which are the subset of the solutions to the GNEP that are also solutions to the associated variational inequality (the interested reader is referred to [10] for further details). In this case study, the variational solutions can be interpreted as those solutions obtained when the MGs must reach consensus not only on the energy bought and sold, but also on the price of such energy transactions, which naturally arise from the optimal Lagrange multipliers associated to (1). Proposition 1. The variational solutions of the GNEP defined by (3), ∀m = 1, . . . , M, are solutions of the following NUM problem:
where y contains the strategy of the different MGs, y [g, e] with g = (gm) , and where its associated feasible set is
Gi :
T |Mm| emt, ∀m, t, e mm t + e m mt = 0, ∀(m, m ) ∈ M, ∀t . Additionally, the converse implication holds true as well.
Proof. The proof is done in two steps: (a) we show that the variational solutions of the GNEP defined by (3) are also solutions of the variational inequality VI(Y, F) with F = (Fm) M m=1 and Fm = ∇y m fm(ym), and vice versa; and (b), we demonstrate that the solutions to VI(Y, F) are solutions of the network utility maximization problem in (4), and vice versa. The proof of (a) follows from [10, Lemma 4.3] by noting that (i) the sets {gm ∈ Gm, em ∈ Em : gmt = u∈Um 1 T Lxut − 1 T |Mm | emt, ∀t} are nonempty, closed and convex, ∀m; (ii) the objective function of each MG, fm(ym), is twice continuously differentiable; and (iii) the shared constraint in (1) is continuously differentiable and jointly convex. The proof of (b) follows by noting that the KKT system of VI(Y, F) is equivalent to the KKT optimality conditions of (4).
From Proposition 1 it follows that the variational solutions of the GNEP are convenient equilibrium points as they achieve the same performance than a cooperative strategy aimed at minimizing the total cost. Next, we obtain the variational solutions of the GNEP by solving (4) in a distributed way by means of dual decomposition. Since (4) is convex and the Slater constraint qualification holds, the duality gap (difference between the optimal values of the primal and dual problems) is zero [11] . The dual problem is convex and reads max λ miny L(y, λ), where L(y, λ) is the Lagrangian of (4) when the constraint in (1) is relaxed, λ mm t is the associated dual variable, and λ = ((λ mm t )t∈T ) (m,m )∈Mm . With a slight abuse of Step 1: If a global termination condition is met, the algorithm stops.
Step 2: Compute the primal iterate, y
m , e gm ∈ Gm, em ∈ Em.
Step 3: Send e (k) mm t
and receive e (k) m mt from MGs m ∈ Mm.
Step 4: Update the dual variables following the subgradient, i.e.,
, ∀m ∈ Mm, t.
Step 5: Set k := k + 1 and go to Step 1.
notation, we use λ mm t and λ m mt to denote the same variable. To solve the dual problem, we resort to the subgradient method, as presented in Algorithm 1, that guarantees convergence to the optimal dual variables, λ , if the updating step size (k) is correctly chosen [12] . Finally, the optimal primal solution, y , is obtained as y = argmin L(y, λ ) if y is feasible [13, Sec. B.5.3].
ENERGY TRADING WITH DR AGGREGATORS
In the second case study, depicted in Fig. 1 , we consider that the MGs decide to contract AGs to provide DR services. At the same time, each user contracts one AG to manage their demand flexibility according to the specified energy discounts. Let Uam denote the set of users served by AG a in MG m. Thus, we have Um = ∪ A a=1 Uam, where A denotes the number of AGs in the system.
In this scenario, AGs can shift user loads fromxu to xu in order to reduce MGs' costs. In compensation, the m-th MG offers a fraction Γm ∈ [0, 1] of its savings to the AGs, i.e., ΓmΔfm(ym). The savings at MG m are Δfm(ym) = fm(y m ) − fm(ym), with y m being the strategy at the m-th MG when no DR is performed, which has been derived in Section 3. If Γm = 1 all the savings are split among the AGs, while if Γm = 0 all the benefits are for the MG operator. Thus, a value of Γm ∈ (0, 1) is likely so that all the agents benefit from the DR savings. Additionally, based on the number of users and their flexibility, each AG might obtain a different share, Γam, of the total share Γm, with Γm = A a=1 Γam. Thus, MG m incentivates AG a to perform DR by rewarding it with ΓamΔfm(ym). We assume that shares Γam are fixed and known. In this case study, both the MGs and the AGs are responsible for ensuring load and supply balance in the grid:
The objective of each MG is to design ym = [gm, em] to maximize its revenue: qm( u∈Um 1 T LTxu ) − (fm(ym) + ΓmΔfm(ym)). Note that we have included the cost associated to the DR service to be paid to AGs, ΓmΔfm(ym). We further consider that the MGs do not reveal their cost functions, fm(·), nor their strategy, ym, to other agents due to severe privacy concerns. Thus, MG m just reveals the total obtained share ΓamΔfm(ym) to AG a. The objective of AG a is to design the load vectors of its users,xa (xu) u∈∪ M m=1 Uam , that maximize the AG benefits:
Algorithm 2 Subgradient algorithm with DR AGs
Initialization: Set k := 0 and initialize λ Step 1: If a global termination condition is met, the algorithm stops.
Step 2: Compute the primal iterates as:
Step 3: Exchange the required information.
Step 4: Update the required dual variables following the subgradient. MG m: For all t, a and m ∈ Mm, compute λ (k+1) mm t as in Algorithm 1, and
as given above, ∀m, t.
Step 5: Set k := k + 1 and go to Step 1. This defines a GNEP of M + A players, whose strategies are coupled due to the conditions in (1) and (5). After removing the constant terms in the objective function of each player, the m-th MG problem reads
where Ym(e−m, (xa) A a=1 ) = {gm ∈ Gm, em ∈ Em : e mm t + e m mt = 0, ∀m ∈ Mm, ∀t, gmt
Similarly, the problem of AG a is
Proposition 2. The variational solutions of the GNEP in (6) and (7) are equivalent to the solutions of the following optimization problem
where z stacks the vectors ym, ∀m, andxa, ∀a, with feasible set Z {z : gm ∈ Gm, em ∈ Em, xu ∈ Xu, ∀m, u}. Proof. The proof follows similarly to the proof of Proposition 1.
As before, problem (8) can be distributedly solved by resorting to dual decomposition. To that end, define λ mm t and μmt as the dual variables associated to the constraints in (8b) and (8c), respectively. Algorithm 2 presents the subgradient algorithm to solve the dual problem of (8) . As argued before, the algorithm converges to the optimal dual variables if the step size, (k) , is correctly chosen, and the primal variables can be obtained as the minimizers (if feasible) of the Lagrangian at the optimal dual variables.
The signaling required by Algorithm 2 is performed in Step 3. Apart from the signaling among MGs, MGs need to send their aggregate strategy (per slot) to those AGs that are operating in the MG. Similarly, AGs only broadcast the aggregate strategy per slot to the MGs where they operate and to other active AGs in the MG.
NUMERICAL RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS
In this section, we numerically evaluate the performance of the variational solutions in each case study, namely, "Trading (T)" and "Trading & DR (T-DR)", obtained in Sections 3 and 4, respectively. Both scenarios are compared with respect to the performance obtained by the optimal solution of the NUM problem [i.e., the problem in (8) particularized for Γm = 0, ∀m], which corresponds to the case where MGs and AGs cooperate to minimize the total cost.
We consider a system composed of M = 2 MGs and one AG. The slot duration is set to one hour. MGs 1 and 2 are powered with the oil generators U12 and U100 of [14] with maximum generated energy 12 and 100 MWh, respectively, i.e., G1 = [0, 12] MWh and G2 = [0, 100] MWh. The associated cost functions (MWh → $) are c1t(x) = 86.39 + 56.56x + 0.33x 2 and c2t(x) = 781.52+43.66x+0.05x
2 , ∀t, as reported in [14] . Both MGs charge qm = 200$/MWh, which is a typical electricity price. The cost of transferring energy is set to γ mm t (x) = αx 2 , ∀m, m , t, where α is a constant in $/MWh 2 . As in [1] , the maximum transferred energy is set to 100 MWh, i.e., Em = [−100, 100] MWh. Similarly to [8] , the discomfort of the users is modeled as d ut (x ut ) = β(x ut −x ut ) 2 , ∀ , u, t, where β is a constant in $/(MWh) 2 . MGs share evenly the saving of DR with the AG, thus Γm = 0.5. loads for the strategy T-DR under two different configurations of α and β, which are given in the legend in $/(MWh) 2 . It is observed that the higher the transfer cost is, the more the load is equalized my means of DR. Fig. 2(c) depicts the resulting trading strategy between the two MGs, where it is observed that MG 1 buys energy from MG 2. MG 1, whose maximum generation capacity is 12 MWh, is only able to fulfill its load requirements by buying energy from MG 2 and by exploiting DR. It is observed that MG 2 barely equalizes its load. The reason behind this is that the linear component of the generation curves, cmt, dominates over the quadratic term. When the curvature of the generation curve is more pronounced, e.g., cmt(x) = x 2 , which is the cost function used in [8] , DR offers higher gains. Fig. 3 evaluates the total cost of the grid when the constants α and β are varied. Since the strategy T does not perform DR, its cost is not affected by variations of the discomfort, β; however, its cost increases with the transfer constant α. The generalized NE obtained in Section 4, T-DR, performs close to the cooperative NUM solution.
Finally, Fig. 4 shows the benefits of each player versus variations on the transfer constant. The benefit of the m-th MG is computed as specified in Sections 3 and 4, but it includes the cost or benefit associated to the MG trading, t∈T m ∈Mm λ mm t e mm t , where λ mm t are the optimal Lagrange multipliers associated to the trading constraint in (1), which can be interpreted as the agreed energy price [1] . The left y-axis refers to MGs while the right y-axis refers to the benefits of the AG. MG 2 has higher benefits than MG 1 because it serves a higher load and sells energy to MG 1. When comparing the strategies T and T-DR, it is observed that MG 2 highly benefits from DR as it can reduce the energy bought to MG 1, which ultimately penalizes MG 1. The benefits of the AG increase with α since the higher the transfer cost is, the more DR is exploited.
In conclusion, this paper has studied the variational solutions of two noncooperative GNEPs: (i) the GNEP between MGs without DR; and (ii) the GNEP between MGs and DR AGs. Two distributed algorithms have been proposed to compute the variational solutions of these GNEPs that perform close to the cooperative solution of the NUM problem and preserve the privacy of each player.
